EU-CARE:

REFUGEE ENTREPRENEURS IN GREECE

   National Contribution to the EU funded programme for the European Commission  Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs, under the budget line B3- 4113, integration of refugees; Unit A/2 "Immigration and Asylum".

Dr.Elizabeth Mestheneos,

SEXTANT Group.

c/o Pygmalionos 8,

118-51 Athens, Greece

Tel: 0030 210 3461742

info@sextant.gr 

liz.mestheneos@sextant.gr

www.sextant.gr                                                                                                July 2000

CONTENTS

1. Executive summary                                                                                  3

2. Introduction                                                                                         4

2.1 The Greek labour market

2.2. The informal or non registered economy                                                    5

2.3 The role of self-employment in Greece.                                                            6

2.4. Patterns of migration versus refugee settlement.                                          7

3.       Refugees in Greece and entrepreneurship                                                              9

3.1.Historical background            

3.2.The size of refugee communities                                                     10

3.3. Migrants                                                                                              12

3.4.The Study of Refugee Entrepreneurs.                                                  13

3.5.Programmes supporting refugee self-employment                              15

4. Success and failure in refugee enterprises.                                          20

4.1.Facilities and services                                                23

4.2. Discrimination                                                             25

4.3. Business idea / insight into  demand                              26

4.4. Barriers to refugee entrepreneurship.                               26

5. Recommendations and Ideas for supporting refugee self employment       28

Appendix : Interviewed                                                                        33        

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                        34

1. Executive summary

This report examines refugee self-employment and entrepreneurship in Greece, underlining the problems that refugees face, the programmes available to help them  and further solutions to meet their current difficulties.

Throughout Europe refugee unemployment or underemployment represents a serious problem[1]. Many refugees have considerable abilities and an independence of character which might be perceived as qualities associated with becoming entrepreneurs, yet they face serious difficulties in starting and running enterprises.. Inadequate knowledge of the local language, of the laws and requirements for operating businesses, a lack of access to capital, guarantees and guarantors, are just some of the obvious problems. This report seeks to explore how these and other problems affect refugee self-employment in Greece with the further aim of promoting better public understanding and appropriate policies to aid refugees. Given the absence of official data on Greek SMEs and migrant or refugee entrepreneurs, this report has focused on some of the  specific difficulties faced by refugees who manage to establish a business in Greece as well as  the barriers they face when trying to become self-employed. The report makes recommendations for  policies which need to be considered in order to help refugees into  self-employment and to support their enterprises.

2  Introduction

2.1. The Greek labour market

The specific structure of and the rapid changes in the Greek economy and society in the past decade constitutes the context for understanding the situation of those few refugees living in the country who have sought the road of self employment and entrepreneurship. It is interestingly to note the history of refugees and entrepreneurship  in Greece. They played a significant role in the Greek economy from the late 1920 and 30s when many Greeks, who became refugees as a result of the Asia Minor disaster of 1921, were forced to leave modern Turkey for rural, poverty stricken Greece. They brought with them their industrial skills, a little capital and the urgent need to find work; they stimulated a spirit of entrepreneurship that helped lay the basis for the transformation of the Greek economy. Still today entrepreneurship is prized and culturally desired and the level of self-employment is the highest in the European Union[2]. However these entrepreneurial refugees were Greeks, able to speak the language and, to a considerable extent, sharing the same culture. The refugees who have arrived in Greece in recent years are not of Greek origins[3]. Yet some of the same conditions for Greek refugees in the 1930s hold for refugees today. They have no land and little capital. They face a labour market with a high rate of unemployment and great difficulties in finding permanent work in the ‘normal’ labour market. Inevitably these problems  push some into contemplating self-employment. Many are unable to create their own businesses, for reasons that will be explained in this report, yet others, despite the odds, succeed. Few have substantial entrepreneurial backgrounds and none have extensive capital.  This report focuses on the experiences of refugee entrepreneurs and those who attempt to be self-employed in Greece, the problems they face and the kinds of solutions that could be proposed to overcome these blockages.

Two related characteristics  mark the contemporary Greek economy and specifically the labour market, making them somewhat distinctive from other Member states:

I .  the large size of the informal or non registered economy and

II.     the high rate of self employment.

The Greek labour market has been undergoing restructuring in the past five years, a restructuring which is associated with a steady growth in the labour supply (women and migrants mainly),  as well as a growth in the number of new jobs, particularly in the service sector. Overall though employment increased by 2.5% between 1997 and 1998  it could not absorb the labour supply available, which increased by 3.5% in the same period,   leading to a relatively high rate of registered unemployment (currently over 11%) with the rate of unemployment increasing from 9.6% in 1997 to 10.8% in 1998 (Eurostat) [4]. This increase is mainly accounted for by the increase in the number of women entering the labour market, the decline in the numbers seeking work in the agricultural sector,  as well as the introduction of procedures for legalising foreign workers.

Estimates of the numbers of illegal migrants working in Greece is unreliable but 373,000 registered initially two years ago for residence and work permits with the National Manpower and Employment Organization (OAED ) and obtained white or green work and residence permits.  The increases in unemployment have made some in government and amongst the public adopt a more xenophobic attitude towards foreign, migrant workers. However as the Institute of Labour, a research body belonging to the Trades Union Federation, was careful to point out in its annual report for 1999, only a part of the foreign labour force were competing with jobs with Greeks given that most were employed in jobs not desired by Greeks, i.e. the dirty, seasonal, low status, low paid and physically hard jobs. Indeed they make the argument that the influx of migrant labour has had a multiplier effect on the economy and has probably increased turnover and the demand for Greek labour.

2.2. The informal or non registered economy

With over 30% of GNP (Tatso et al 2000, Pavlopoulos 1987) being in the hidden economy, a figure considerably higher than most European Member States, there is a considerable margin for non registered employment.  The reasons for the size of the latter vary but include the high insurance and bureaucratic costs of employing and dismissing employees as well as the desire to evade taxation. A major problem in the Greek economy is trying to ensure that more jobs become registered and official. While governments seek to limit the extent of the black economy, at the same time they are aware that some discretion has to be used. Thus the government and public authorities appear to often disregard illegal employment in selected sectors, such as agriculture, in order to ensure that employers have a supply of cheap labour that will help the competitiveness of Greek exports and products. Additionally in skilled trades competition from both legal and illegal foreign workers in Greece acts as a brake on the wages of Greek nationals. One government goal of the past 5 years has been to reduce inflation in order to meet the European Union criteria  for membership of the euro group and this has had effects on labour market restructuring and some associated unemployment. However unemployment and labour market competition has helped to reduce wage expectations in considerable sections of  the national labour force, lowering  costs and thus inflation, as well as production costs, allowing Greek products and services to stay competitive. 

The potential for the non-registered employment of immigrants, refugees and Greeks still remains considerable. Employment sectors such as construction, agriculture and domestic services,  where the informal economy is large, are also sectors where those of foreign origins generally find employment. 

2.3. The role of self-employment in Greece.

Another outstanding feature of the Greek economy is the predominance of very small businesses employing less than 5 persons, together with the high rate of self employment,  more than double the rate in other Member States. In 1998 the self-employed constituted 32.5% of all employed compared to 15% for all other MS (European Commission 1999). The decline in the numbers in self- employment (from 34.4% in 1994) is explained in great part by the steady decline in the numbers in agriculture. Small, independent peasant farmers in Europe generally account for 17% of the self employed; thus the decrease in the numbers employed in the agricultural sector in Greece has been accompanied by some decline in the overall percentage in self employment. However if one examines self-employment in the other two major sectors of employment, industry and services, the rate of self-employment is still higher than in all other Member States. In 1988 28% were self-employed in these sectors, declining to 26% by 1998. On the other hand there has been a slight increase during this same period in the numbers of the self employed who employ others (from 6 to 7.5%) though the average size in Greece was 3 employed persons (European Observatory 1997) . Only Italy has a larger percentage of the self employed employing other personnel,  representing over 50% of all the self employed and accounting for 12% of all employment in industry and services[5]. Most (78%) of self employment in Greece occurs in  the private sector, with 22%  in the public sector.

The efforts of the past 4 years to modernise the tax system and economy and reduce the scale of non declared economic activities,  is putting pressure on all small businesses to incorporate their activities and exchanges as part of the formal economy. Not all can bear the costs of modernisation and the paying of tax and insurance. As a result many are being forced to close; in 1999 more than three times more small businesses closed than opened, according to the President of the National Federation of Small and Medium size businesses. This constitutes the general economic climate for small businesses and, as will be explained, the new measures have consequences for refugees, both  as a labour force and in relation to self-employment. Though hard data about Greek SMEs is difficult to cite, it appears that there is an increasing dichotomy between those small enterprises and individuals in self employment that have managed to modernise, specialise, stay flexible and  sub-contract, letting them remain competitive with or for larger firms, and those who have become increasingly marginalized (Greek Statistical Service 1998). The low labour costs of the latter - whether through the use of family or unregistered labour and extensive personal overtime, allows many to survive. Until recently the very high cost of borrowing ( 47% interest and bank costs per annum was not unusual) acted as a break on investment. Small businesses may still be very wary of borrowing.

2.4. Patterns of migration versus refugee settlement.

            The country of origin of migrants plays a role in their subsequent location and residence patterns in Greece. The last decade has seen very high rates of migration into Greece with the end of the Communist regimes and the economic problems that have resulted. Of the large numbers of Albanians who have come to work in Greece, there are data and reports  from every region of Greece that they are to be found working in rural and urban areas, formally and informally. This holds for those from the Eastern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Moldavia, Romania) some of whom come on land routes and also have spread throughout Greece. However other migrants came to Greece much earlier and have had some time to establish themselves in independent employment.  A report commented on the Egyptians and Pakistanis in Greece for three decades who had established small firms in catering, retail trade, tourism, taxis, while a few have entered the professions (Fakiolas 1997); Poles came slightly later but some have also entered into enterprises on their own or with Greek partners[6]. However these comments on self-employment and entrepreneurs is at the level of observation rather than statistical data.  Since there is no data on SMEs under migrant ownership, there is no evidence of patterns of entrepreneurship[7]. At the level of observation Athens attracts foreign and migrant entrepreneurs, many of who have been working for some years in Greece, though others appear to have come without being migrant labourers prior to this e.g. Koreans, Chinese, Nigerians. The recent legalization of many illegal migrants means that some are now able to start up their own enterprises[8]. 

In contrast refugees, even though arriving mainly at the eastern border regions of Greece and requesting asylum there (e.g. Thrace and the Aegean islands), move overwhelmingly to Athens both to obtain help from the NGOs and services[9] for refugees and asylum seekers centred there, as well as to meet up with compatriots and kin. The lack of public welfare support means that nearly all are forced to work to survive in the illegal economy, particularly in the first year or so after arrival. Seasonal demands for labour lead some to leave Athens for rural or tourist areas and some, specifically those who decide to settle as refugees in Greece, may remain in these areas. However they are a  minority and most remain in the Attica region.  Though there is a technical and real difference between the status of a refugee and a migrant, this is not always obvious to the individuals involved. Member States have different practices with respect to the recognition of asylum seekers from different countries. Asylum seekers and refugees alike know this and individuals from Middle Eastern countries and Africa affected by these variations in national governments’ policies often find them puzzling.

3.     Refugees in Greece and entrepreneurship

3.1. Historical background

Refugees were accepted by Greece when it became a signatory to the U.N. Geneva Convention in 1951; at this period of time, when it was a very poor state marked by a civil war and mass emigration it made an important exclusion clause. Those provided with asylum and refugee status were not given the right to work legally in the country. Every effort was made to help them leave for the countries of resettlement i.e. USA, Australia, Canada,  and  resettlement agencies such as the International Organization for Migration, were important. Refugees and the Government expected that the majority of refugees and asylum seekers would migrate or be resettled onwards to 3^rd countries where the reception and employment conditions were considered better and indeed where many refugees wanted and indeed still desire to go. The absence of public welfare state support e.g. social welfare benefits, for refugees (as for local Greeks), was another factor pushing them into onwards migration. UNHCR provided practical and economic support for asylum seekers and refugees waiting for resettlement, while they  also cooperated with local NGOs to support their work. One form of support were  small scale grants and loans designed to enable refugees to survive by practicing small scale self employment, with the Social Work Foundation being one of the major cooperating NGOs for UNHCR in implementing this programme. Until the early 1990s refugees were generally able to find illegal employment, since unemployment was not as high as the rest of Europe. Mass immigration into Greece from 1990 onwards worsened their position in the informal labour market. Though in the 1980s the numbers with Convention, Mandate and humanitarian status were not vastly different from the numbers currently present in Greece, refugees at that time almost never could get a work permit though they could find work.

In the year 2000 the situation is quite different,  since refugees with status have the right to obtain a work permit as well as a residence permit. While this theoretically facilitates work in the legal employment market, in fact their situation is very problematic given the high rate of unemployment and the very large increase in the numbers of migrant workers arriving in Greece, seeking work in the non registered as well as the registered labour market. This has led to increasing competition for refugees for those jobs where language skills and qualifications are not required.

It became increasingly clear in the 1990s that resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers in Greece to  third countries of resettlement was no longer tenable. Greece could no longer be considered a poor country; it was a member of the EU and increasingly able to support the integration of the small numbers of recognised refugees as well as the reception of asylum seekers. This perspective is still taking a long time to be adopted by successive Greek governments. The long delay in processing asylum applications together with the low levels of financial and practical support offered officially by the government has become a self fulfilling prophesy as asylum seekers choose to resettle elsewhere, often in other European Member States. The UNHCR still funds a large part of the social support programme for asylum seekers and refugees,  though all the NGO agencies involved in asylum and refugee work, including the Greek Council for Refugees, the Red Cross, the International Social Services, the Social Work Foundation as well as many other smaller initiatives, have been searching elsewhere for funding and the social and economic support of refugees. The Greek government has contributed matching funding in the relevant European Union programmes proposed by NGOs, but still appears to have no overall public policy for reception, integration or repatriation. Some local authorities are beginning to become more sensitised to their role in social integration for both refugees and migrants.

3.2 The size of refugee communities

A paper by Fakiolas (1997)  provides figures for the numbers asking for political asylum between 1985-1995; it suggests that from a total of 61,000 who asked for asylum, a total of 22,225  political and economic refugees were resettled overseas, a half from Iraq and Poland,  with 21,000 obtaining work permits in Greece.[10] What happened to the remaining 18,000 odd asylum seekers we do not know; emigration on to third countries, or settlement as illegal migrants followed, in some cases, by the legalization of their migrant status, are the most likely scenarios.

The Greek Council for Refugees in its report for March 2000 states that there are currently 6,363 refugees in Greece predominantly from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Turkey) with a very much smaller number coming from various African countries.  Table 1 provides some figures for refugees assisted financially by GCR in 1998-9 by country of origin; many more refugees are helped with advice, services and support of many kinds but the figures indicate the proportions of refugees in relation to their national origins.  Many individuals from Turkey and Iraq are Kurds.  Approximately 1,600 people were given asylum in 1998.

Providing accurate figures on the number of refugees in the total Greek population is difficult for several reasons;

·        Refugees do not all have the same status. Some have humanitarian status, i.e. leave to stay, without having fully recognised Convention status. 

·        When does someone cease to be a refugee? Often the adoption of citizenship in the host country is seen as marking the stage at which someone ceases to be a refugee. However not every refugee applies for citizenship. In addition in Greece there are no figures on the numbers of refugees given citizenship; it is still relatively rare though it occurs. Individual refugees who do not seek help from NGOs for refugees, may still only have refugee status and papers. Even where they are considered settled e.g. the Vietnamese community, their lack of Greek nationality makes them still belong to the category of "refugee",  however they may feel about their country of adoption and residence.

·                  a considerable number of refugees,  subsequent to the recognition of their status, choose to migrate onwards to third countries. This may prove increasingly difficult within the EU but is still common[11], while refugees with relatives in the USA, Canada, may still hope for family reunion and, indeed,  sometimes obtain it. Resettlement in third countries has been difficult since the mid 1990s suggesting that perhaps more refugees live in Greece but are no longer dealt with by the NGOs.

·                  Some refugees marry  Greeks, mainly for love but sometimes simply to make their lives simpler[12]; this alters their legal status even if they do not apply for citizenship. However they may still suffer overall from the social and economic disadvantages associated with their refugee status.

Table 1. Refugees helped financially by GCR 1998-99 by country of origin.

3.3. Migrants

The problem of the lack of  accurate figures on the numbers of refugees, a relatively small group in the total numbers of foreigners in Greece, does not compare with the problem of estimating the numbers of migrants living and working in Greece. Even more than refugees they are highly mobile, both regionally,  internationally and seasonally leading to wild and fluctuating guesses as to their actual numbers. This makes the figures of those registering with the National Manpower Employment Organization (OAED) particularly insightful and helpful[13].  Of the group applying to OAED in 1998 for employment permits  300,000 were registered with the various national insurance funds: 190,000 with IKA ( the Urban Workers fund) and 90,000 with OGA (The Agricultural Workers Fund) .  Of particular interest are the numbers (20,000) declaring that they are insured with TEBE, the insurance fund for the self-employed. While these figures refer to migrants, it is not entirely clear if these numbers include a few refugees. Nonetheless the 6% registered as self-employed amongst the newly registered migrant group may be argued to present the  current dimensions  of self-employment amongst recent migrants mainly from non EU countries. A large proportion of all migrants originate  from Albania (65%  total including those of Greek origins) with other nationalities also well represented. e.g. Bulgarians ( 6.53%), Romania ( 4,52%), Pakistan (3.17%), Ukraine ( 2.64%), Poland (2,25%), Georgia (2.01%), India (1,77%), Egypt (1,67%), Phillippines (1,50%), Moldavia (1,16%), Syria (0,92%). The remaining 6.94% was distributed amongst other nationalities (INE 1999). A large percentage were men and the educational level was higher for women migrants than for men, in large part explained by their country of origin. Overall for both sexes 49.1% were secondary school graduates, 37.0% primary school level graduates, and 8.89% were university level graduates. They were widely distributed throughout Greece with 38.3% being found in the capital; they represent 4.36% of the total population, though this proportion increases to 5.2% in the Attica region. [14]

The National Statistical Bureau of Greece does not provide figures on the number of foreign entrepreneurs nor even on the overall numbers and profile of  Greek enterprises in Greece. All data is incomplete and out of date.  Only figures on the numbers of self employed, reported in the Labour Force surveys, can be considered reasonably accurate. It thus follows that there are no figures on the numbers of refugee entrepreneurs and self-employed.

3.4. The Study of Refugee Entrepreneurs.

In the original study design the researchers were requested to provide as much data as possible on refugee entrepreneurs, including their origins, the percentage and numbers of refugee entrepreneurs per country of origin, the average growth rate of the number of refugee entrepreneurs, the prevalence of refugee entrepreneurs in the  main refugee communities and whether this is higher or lower than the national growth rate of number of entrepreneurs. None of this data can be provided from nationally available figures. The problems concerning the lack of data are evident not only with reference to refugees but also for migrants and Greek nationals.

Historically almost the first group of non Greek political refugees to be accepted for permanent resettlement in Greece were approximately 250 Vietnamese refugees between 1979-81. Initial help was provided for resettlement by UNHCR and they were found employment in factories, market gardens and hotels. Resources were limited, yet despite this a very large percentage of the Vietnamese community now are self employed, predominantly in many ‘Chinese’ restaurants throughout the Athens region and in Rhodes. These businesses were funded almost entirely by savings from the Vietnamese community who developed cooperatives in setting up the first two restaurants. Still many restaurants are set up with cooperative and family capital.  In Rhodes one or two large families also saved and then  invested in their own businesses. Two explanations can be given for the extent and success of Vietnamese entrepreneurship; in one case, in the Athens area,  they took advice from one of their members who was better educated and who suggested that savings and investment in their own businesses was the only way out of  dependent employment; in the other case the independent peasant and fishing backgrounds of the families and the availability of family labour provided the stimulus to becoming self-employed once again. The networks of  Vietnamese family and kin throughout the world and the many examples of self-employment also probably acted as a stimulus to considering self-employment. The evidence for the extent of self-employment comes from a qualitative study on the integration of Vietnamese in Greece (Mestheneos, Ioannidi 1998).

A rather smaller group (70) of Kurds was accepted at about the same time as the Vietnamese but little appears to be known about them; while some moved on to Germany and reunion with other family members, some have stayed and one or two enterprises have begun in which they participate[15].

However overall there is no data on refugee or migrant businesses. Although the Municipalities e.g. Athens, provides some data on the number of applications for licences to open businesses from foreigners (Petropoulos 1990) , there is no break down on their characteristics. Thus everyone from large multinational corporations to small size entrepreneurs are included in such figures. There is no analysis provided by origins, types of business, and thus no detail as to whether individuals are from refugee origins or not. No systematic data is available about the failure rates of small businesses. The General Federation of Small and Medium Enterprises periodically publishes reports; in 2000 it reported that twice as many SMEs closed in 1999 as opened. However there is no breakdown of this data either by the nationality of the owner or type of enterprise.  In fact there are virtually no national statistics available on the characteristics of SMEs.

Given the lack of data it is impossible to talk about official failure rates for  Greek, migrant or refugee businesses. Attempts by refugees to start their own businesses, officially and unofficially, do frequently meet failure  for reasons which are described below. However one cannot know whether their failure is more frequent than amongst the general population since there is no data.  From the interviews it was evident that one or two refugees who had failed in their enterprise or faced setbacks in making them legitimate, still had  entrepreneurial inclinations[16] , continuing with plans about how they could begin another business or manage to legalise their non registered enterprise. 

As stated earlier, the average size of SMEs in Greece is reported as involving less than  5 employees, reflecting limited market demand, low levels of capitalisation and specialisation. These features do not differentiate them from refugee businesses and many are still linked to support from family members. In the case of refugees interviewed for this study, other fellow countrymen or  non registered migrant workers tend to be the source of  extra labour.  Refugee businesses that were able to become legal also reported employing others legally. One business employed  4 refugees regularly and one Greek part time; another periodically employed two other migrants; another provided some part time employment for other refugees and migrants. The physical visibility of the enterprise e.g. restaurants, is one factor that pushes SMEs , whether Greek or refugee owned, to register their employees for tax and insurance purposes. 

The high concentration of refugees in the urban area of Athens is reflected in the concentration of refugee businesses there. In the case of  restaurants and cafes, refugee businesses appear to be scattered amongst other Greek businesses and there is no evidence of them being concentrated in ghetto or very poor areas.  Though refugees tend to be concentrated in some central  neighbourhoods of Athens, their few numbers does not make them distinctive. Additionally migrants also tend to be scattered throughout the country and major cities[17].

3.5. Programmes supporting refugee self-employment

Given the worsening employment situation of refugees over the past years NGOs and the National Manpower Employment Organization have become increasingly involved in trying to find ways of supporting refugee self-employment.

One of the programmes, that started originally in 1983 and is supported financially by the UNHCR Branch Office in Greece, provides of a self sufficiency grant / loan (70% loan, 30% grant)  to refugees seeking to start up in small businesses and self employment; UNHCR supported such programmes in countries and areas  where the possibilities of refugee self sufficiency through regular employment is particularly difficult (UNHCR 1988). In Greece the fact that they could not get work permits but had to survive was the stimulus for the programme. However the general  insecurity facing refugees and asylum seekers pushed  most to emigrate.  Thus the self sufficiency loans and grants during this period were mainly a way of enabling them to subsist until they resettled elsewhere, and were not successful as a way of encouraging genuine entrepreneurship. These grants were stopped in 1987 and officially restarted in 1993 with the change in government policy, in line with EU laws,  which provided the necessary preconditions for refugees to settle and work in Greece. The programme began again in 1995  with small loans and grants to such enterprises as street trading and sewing, with larger amounts to two doctors and a taxi driver.  The ‘territorial’ division in Athens of refugees between the SWF and GCR determined which agency refugees went to for help with their self employment projects.  Data from the Social Work Foundation and the Greek Council for Refugees for the period December 1995 to June 1998 provides a list of 30  refugee entrepreneurs who were helped to start up in self-employment through these loans[18]. All were required to present a business plan with a budget, with each item costed separately, as well as the repayment schedule. Other criteria for inclusion in the programme was that they were to be Convention refugees, over 18 years of age and old enough to be responsible and able to undertake a business.  They had to know Greek and be familiar with Greek society. Priority was given to single parents households, the disabled, those with large families and only one working member, and women. Given that many had work experience before starting their own enterprise, they often had a tax registration number and knew about some aspects of the tax system. They were able to get advice as to the kind of official receipts that had to be given in the various enterprises. The SWF inspected premises and ensured that the business had some hope of success before providing the loan. Since few individuals received refugee status in less then  1-2 years, they had already developed some knowledge about the steps necessary before opening a business. The SWF preferred to operate a loan system since they believed it made refugees far more responsible. They also reported that the one year EC programmes (see below) were unsuitable for many refugees who needed more than one year to prepare themselves. They reported that refugees often sought self-employment grants as a way of surviving i.e. for consumption rather than investment in an enterprise. The loans, originally given under the UNHCR programme, when returned by refugees to the SWF, could be re-lent to others. However insecurity over future funding meant that they limited the size of the loan to 1,700,000 maximum (5000 euros).

Given the lack of other data, it is helpful for this study if the characteristics of refugees in this programme as well as successes and failures are examined here since it may point to more general lessons.  All except one business were in the tertiary sector, varying from liberal  professionals to catering. Three were in highly skilled employment with Greek re-qualification having been undertaken, the majority had  skills and experiences mainly from their home country, while 8 refugee participants  had few skills. The size of the ‘sample’ is too small to make judgements, but it does appear that those  enterprises which required low skills levels were also those most at risk of closure and failure, however the personality of the individual also played a very strong role in success and failure.  In total 4 of  the businesses were started by women; however 2 of these grants were given to aid their self sufficiency since subsequently one refugee was repatriated and another resettled. Both the other two businesses run by women were in difficulties for family reasons. A total of 5 businesses had closed, though in many cases the refugees had repaid substantial parts of their loans. It is not clear whether those businesses that closed can be termed failures, particularly in those cases where refugees  had in great part repaid the loans given. 4 refugees disappeared; in some cases this was the result of business failure. 6 enterprises reported being in difficulties and currently unable to pay their loan  - difficulties which ranged from health reasons, to fires or problems in registering their business. In total 12 businesses were reported as being OK and had repaid the original loans.  These were, in the majority,  legally registered, since this was one of the initial conditions for the loans, though some were essentially subsistence loans for non registered self-employment.  It ought to be noted that the function of these grants was not just to support refugee entrepreneurs but rather to enable refugees in difficult economic situations to survive. Since they have no access to capital, even a small amount can allow them to start up and become self-sufficient. Thus the criteria for selection for the loans was partly based on a business plan and the perceived viability of the enterprise, but also on need.  The amounts given were in all cases small - the maximum amount was 1,700,000 drachmas (500 euros) The Social Work Foundation continued with the programme, which though small e.g. 7 refugees were given self-sufficiency grants/loans in 1999, is considered important. The higher cost of administering loans as opposed to grants plus the problem of charging non market based interest rates for loans makes it difficult for any organization other than an NGO to take on this work.

            The introduction of the EU Budget Line B3-4113  for the Socio-economic Integration of refugees, allowed GCR from December  1998- December 1999 to support employment integration. One strand in the overall programme was a grant support for self-employment for refugees. The implementation of the programme was done through specially appointed staff as well as the social workers of the organization. The widespread publicity amongst refugees led to more than 103 persons initially applying for information. A committee made up of social workers, refugees from the Refugee Association, a lawyer, a tax advisor and a manager, judged the 69 applications considered;  3 were approved in the first semester and 45 approved in the second[19].  A project manager interviewed prospective refugee entrepreneurs, helping them with the formation of a business plan. Considerable work was done with  applicants so they could understand the skills they would needed, get further training and experience, and obtain  tax advice from Greek and Arab experts, and  counselling from a marketing expert.  45 businesses by refugees with Convention or humanitarian status were helped to start or expand, which in their turn created 30 jobs for other refugees or native Greeks. All began functioning in 1999. However the programme was a pilot one designed to last just  one year.  The maximum grant was 3,048 euros and average 1,913 euros. An analysis of the data in the report for self-sufficiency grants  in December 1999 shows  37 people from the Middle Eastern countries, 6 from Africa and 2 from other countries being helped. 1 grant was given in the primary sector of the economy, 3 in the secondary and the remaining 41 were in the tertiary sector. Of interest is the grant policy that emerges; 19 refugees were helped to work in various forms of retail, mainly as street traders and small shop keepers with 15 were given assistance in applying for street vendor licenses. 8 were helped to purchase computers. 20 were given advice on obtaining  professional or restaurant licences  Though there was a push in trying to help refugees establish viable enterprises, the reality was that refugees and their families  had to be helped to survive, with or without the necessary permits, a factor which also played some part in the allocation of grants.

            Though this was a unique pilot programme it was to be replaced by the programme for groups at risk of social exclusion run nationally by OAED,  which covered refugees from 1999 onwards.  Details of this new programme are found in the next section, on ‘Facilities and services’. The major change was that  GCR no longer controlled the funding and found that the bureaucratic delays in the implementation of the social exclusion programme made life difficult for them and the refuges. Another major change was that refugees had now to finish a vocational training course in a KEK in order to be eligible for a grant. By Spring 2000 refugees were still waiting for grant monies from this programme.

4. Success and failure in refugee enterprises.

It will be helpful in the design of future policies and programmes if the possible causes for success and failure in refugee businesses are examined.

It appeared, based on the interviews with the refugees and discussions with those in the NGOs, that many refugees did try and make adequate business plans. The SWF, and more recently GCR, have begun to offer more systematic and technical advice and counselling to refugees contemplating self-employment. One major problem reported by refugees and NGOs was that of bureaucratic delays in getting permissions and licences. While in Athens these tended to be given more rapidly, particularly in recent years, in the provinces lack of information on the situation of refugees and low levels of efficiency in the public sector explain the more extensive delays[20]. Evidence from two refugee entrepreneurs suggested that public agencies such as tax. Social insurance and  OAED offices as well as local authorities, are less well informed in the provinces. Additionally the changes in legislation e.g. for employment programmes which now permit refugees to be eligible, are often not know to those in the labour offices of OAED. Delays in receiving the monies from programmes may sometimes prove fatal to a new enterprise. For some this happened at critical moments and they were vulnerable, having to pay rents when the demand was at its lowest e.g. in the summer months in Athens.

In general refugee enterprises were undercapitalised and often in problematic premises.  Emergencies that arose which were outside their control e.g. huge water bills, family illness, were sometimes the cause of business failure. 

The backgrounds of refugees appears to play a significant part in their success as well as their entrepreneurial spirit (and indeed these factors were taken into account in the SWF loan system).

·        educational level - those with more education and skills appeared to have a greater probability of knowing the procedures they had to go through to become legalised as a business, to be aware of marketing and the promotion of their service.

·        social and personal networks - there appeared to be a recognition that in developing a clientele a refugee had either to draw on a network of countrymen sharing  common cultural or political backgrounds and goals, or  else had to have worked with Greeks for extended periods of time, enabling them to be more knowledgeable about the kind of support and information they needed for the enterprise as well as personal customer contact. Most refugees reported in interviews that they had been helped by Greeks when setting up their business and were able to call upon aid from specific Greek friends  and people in the local community (refugees, migrants and Greeks). It should also be noted that two of the registered businesses were based on partnerships with other refugees or migrants sharing a common background.[21] Another refugee was helped initially by advice and support from professional colleagues in Greece.

·        entrepreneurial background - though cafes and restaurants run by refugees did fail and the background of the refugees is not known,  the three successfully registered businesses interviewed in this sector involved people who had experience from their home country in running or being involved in such businesses, giving them some knowledge of the work involved. 

·        Experience of living  in Greece for some years prior to starting an enterprise. Those individuals who had registered businesses were able to speak Greek well, were more aware of the  paper work that would be involved, had or knew how to get the necessary contacts for the enterprise..

The motivations for self-employment related to the need to earn a basic income and their prior experience of short term contracts, insecure or badly paid employment, which applied whatever their educational level or nationality. The lack of other jobs at their professional and skill level also stimulated some into self-employment. Health problems, which made finding work as a dependent employee difficult, was the cause which led one refugee to become self-employed. Another recognised that as an older worker he was unlikely to get work from an employer. Another also pointed to the lack of access to the public sector since only Greek nationals could be employed there. For all the refugees interviewed, there were  pleasures as well as pains in being self-employed since it conferred a higher status, independence and a way of avoiding insecurity and marginality. They gained self-respect by developing their own business and facing the challenges that such an enterprise involved. It also enabled them to meet Greeks on an equal footing - whether as customers, neighbours, suppliers and friends. 

In two of the cases interviewed it was striking that the refugees had been over 12 years in Greece before reporting to an NGO to ask for help in setting up a business. In one of these cases, though known to be a refugee, the individual had managed independently, but with an accident he had to change his plans and seek self-employment. In the other case the individual had never registered as an asylum seeker, leaving this to his father. The latter’s death and the respondent’s  responsibility for the family’s numerous siblings, some of whom also had serious health problems, drove the individual to ask for help from an NGO and registration as a refugee 9 years after his arrival. This underlines the role that NGOs have not only with "new" refugees but also with those long living in the country whose economic position is still highly vulnerable. 

            The economic vulnerability of refugees is also reflected in the lack of state social insurance coverage reported by some of both the registered and unregistered refugees.  The cost of social insurance for the self-employed is over 45,000 drachmas (133 euros) monthly. This cost as well as the need to pay rent and feed themselves and their  family accounted for many refugees being unable to register as  legitimate businesses. Two refugee entrepreneurs reported having taken out private insurance, particularly  for health emergencies.

            While the same laws and regulations officially cover Greeks and non Greeks in different kinds of employment sectors,  one refugee reported that in employment where it was considered that there were Greek trained people available to undertake the work, the authorities were very unwilling to grant a license for self-employment. Generally each kind of job may require different kinds of licences, though this does not involve generally proof of proficiency (European Commission 1997). All (refugees, migrants and Greeks) need to register with the relevant social insurance fund (TEBE) and the tax authorities. Those who wish to start restaurants with more than 49 chairs also have to submit plans and obtain planning permission and a license from the Ministry of Planning and Environment. Those who wish to use the pavement for their business have to ask for permission and pay an additional tax to the local authority. Those with restaurants and café have also to fulfil hygiene regulations for kitchens and toilets. This means inspection by the relevant officials from the local authority. Additionally in some cases the police may come to inspect the premises if there is any report of irregularities, noise, or the non registration of premises or workers. These conditions are common for refugees and Greeks alike, both for setting up new businesses and for operating existing ones. These regulations are not gathered together and cannot easily be referred to and are also sector and type of business specific. However the widespread experience of self-employment amongst Greeks means that despite the  lack of systematic public information on setting up new enterprises, much information is available at the informal level. Several refugees reported cases where others, both from NGOs and from Greeks with enterprises, had been able to give them the necessary advice, accompany them to the relevant public services and introduce them to good accountants. The issue of professional certification in order for a refugee to open some kinds of business arose with the case of the medical doctor helped to open his own surgery (consulting rooms) who passed all necessary re-qualification examinations. It was not clear with respect to some occupations such as hairdressing[22].

For Greeks, as well as refugees, there are problems about getting advice from the public services and despite various proposals to simplify the procedures

  "the collection of different certificates and registration necessary for start ups at present is an especially cumbersome procedure" European Commission (1997 p.96).

However private advice and services are available. All registered businesses used a lawyer, for their registration of the enterprise, and an accountant, who would also provide advice and act as an intermediary with the tax authorities if necessary. Refugees normally sought advice from others, typically Greeks, with whom they had contact and asked for advice. Few had had difficulties in accessing this advice however specialist external advice other than the accountant was generally not available because of the high costs involved.

The lack of knowledge of refugees about regulations and  requirements with respect to starting or taking over a business explains why the Greek Council of Refugees saw this as an important element in their 1998-99 programme supporting self-employment.  They had reported cases of  refugees starting or taking over an existing business, only to be closed  because they had not fulfilled the official obligations

4.1.Facilities and services

The limited financial scale of the loans and self sufficiency grant available through the SWF and GCR helps explain why only a few refugees have actually used this programme to set up in self employment. The much larger response to the EU and Ministry of Labour programmes of grants and training indicates that there is considerable interest in self-employment by refugees. Given the lack of welfare support and the desire of many refugees to move elsewhere, it is essential that programme-implementing organizations ensure that there is genuine interest, ability and capacity for self-employment.

As already indicated, a major difficulty lies in accessing information in a systematic and up to date manner. Chambers of Commerce and EOMMEX (the Greek Organization for Small and Handicraft businesses) have as their main target groups Greek businesses already operating or planning to operate. Other programmes have been set up, mainly by the National Manpower and Employment Organization (OAED), to help those who are unemployed who wish to start up in self-employment[23]. However this programme did not initially cover those not of Greek or EU nationalities.

The INTEGRA section of the EC EMPLOYMENT initiative was specifically designed to aid special groups including refugees and migrants, at high risk of long term unemployment by providing access to training and employment programmes. There is no data on how many refugees benefited by the self employment element; in the whole total programme 52 were helped to set up in self employment but there is no profile of the individuals and the social category to which they belonged, and indeed the programme is till being completed[24]. This programme was supplemented by the social exclusion programme of the EU under the Ministry of Labour,  and is funded in great part through the European Social Fund. In this programme in the period 1.11.99 until 3.4.2000, 193 refugees and migrants (152 women and 41 men) were helped into new jobs where employers received an employment subsidy, and 41 (22 women and 19 men) were helped to become self employed. They received up to 2,800,000 drachmas (8600 euros), while women and those over 45 years were able to receive 400,000 drachmas  (1170 euros)  more. The innovation in this new programme is that training, provided for the different groups at risk of social exclusion in the various Centres for Professional Training (KEK) ,  is now tied closely to the provision of Centres providing Accompanying Supportive Measures (KESYY) . These are an innovation since it was realised that individuals falling into this category needed special labour market help and counselling as well as follow up.  For the various groups at risk of social exclusion these KESYY are often run by specialist NGOs with experience of working with and supporting  the target group e.g. the disabled, ex- offenders,  returning emigrants and refugees. In the latter case the Greek Council for Refugees, the Social Work Foundation  and the Red Cross were designated as KESYY serving different KEK[25]. However there were long delays in the implementation of the social exclusion programme and only by 1999 did the role of the KESYYs become much  clearer. The programme has now reached its end and has to be evaluated before a  similar programme by OAED and the Ministry of Labour covering the same groups at risk of social exclusion is reintroduced.  It is foreseen that the next EU funded programme , EQUAL, will cover much of the same ground and can use the lessons learned from the EMPLOYMENT/INTEGRA and the social exclusion programmes as well as the institutions now in place.

With respect to government policy on supporting new enterprises, current debate is focused on how young highly educated people  in new high  tech areas can be helped in start ups of  small modern technology businesses through adequate capital funding from government money possibly through using business and Technology parks. This appears to be a high priority ‘target group’ for government policies  in SME and entrepreneurship promotion currently. The other target groups being helped including women, young people, migrants and  refugees, are those who generally are at risk of labour market exclusion i.e. have high unemployment rates, difficulties in accessing capital, inadequate skill levels. Thus the measures taken for the refugee target group are essentially labour market  measures rather  than part of SME policy.

Tax benefits and subsidies are available to small entrepreneurs  willing to set up enterprises in problematic areas of Greece e.g. Thrace, Northern Aegean. Essentially this does not help most very small entrepreneurs without capital investment , or those seeking start ups  in certain forms of service sector employment e.g. catering.

4.2. Discrimination

Discrimination against their business was reported by some refugee entrepreneurs from Middle East countries who felt that though  they were doing OK and had customers, they might have done better if they had been Greek. The jealousies of others, common between Greek businesses,  were also mentioned and there was recognition that this affected everyone  but perhaps  foreigners and refugees slightly more. It was unclear and indeed there were contrary opinions as to the extent of discrimination by suppliers, customers  and government officials. Some reported a lot of help from ordinary Greeks; others reported  indifference or some discrimination. Those of Turkish origin, despite good relations with their Greek customers, did believe that many Greeks were more wary  than if the business had been owned by a Greek.

However the most important problem lay in the indirect discrimination practised by the Greek banks who would not lend money without security, tax returns or a guarantor.

4.3. Business idea / insight into  demand

Limited funds inevitably have  forced many refugees into self employment ventures that do not require large amounts of capital. It is impossible to compare their success/ failure rates with Greek businesses that operate on the same scale. As stated earlier, many Greek SMEs are highly vulnerable to failure and closure and it may be that refugees may be more careful than Greeks. Lack of evidence makes it impossible to know if refugees are less insightful. The current funding that is becoming available through the social exclusion programme and OAED, already indicates that refugees, given the correct training and larger grants, can plan for other  types of employment. However one major problem is that the training being offered through the KEKs does not necessarily relate to the kind of enterprise that refugees themselves wish and decide to start up subsequently. The choice of content for the KEK training courses reflects a more general estimate by the KEK of the potential demand in the market for such employees and skills. There is a much larger problem in Greece of foreseeing and making accurate predictions for labour market demand in different sectors. This is even more striking when discussing the prognosis for SME start-ups and expansion. An example of this is the dangers faced by refugees deciding to start retail and trading businesses. They are vulnerable to competition from the large chain stores and supermarkets, which are expanding rapidly and threatening many small retail businesses. Unless their ‘product’ is different and covers a particular and adequate sized niche market they are likely to face failure, while those who can base their enterprise on their own expertise and contacts are more likely to be successful e.g refugees involved in importing eastern handicrafts or selling oriental carpet. Each case has to be examined with care to understand it’s market demand and potential. Neither NGO personnel nor refugees generally have the expertise or time to undertake such studies. 

4.4. Barriers to refugee entrepreneurship.

Although the main aim of this report was to examine registered refugee businesses, since this ensured that  researchers were examining comparable refugee entrepreneurs in each of the participating countries, it would be unhelpful and pointless if one did not also examine the barriers to becoming a ‘legitimate’ refugee enterprise in Greece.

One of the largest difficulties for refugees was their lack of access to business capital. Several had used the limited loans and grants provided up until recently, but the amounts were too low for adequate capitalisation. Though many had invested considerable amounts of personal labour as well as capital accumulated from savings and investments from friends and family, it was often inadequate to ensure that the business could withstand seasonal variations during the start up period or until the business was well known. Their businesses are vulnerable to any kind of setback and even if potentially  profitable they need enough capital to survive fluctuations. Greek banks require security, based on property, whether from the individual or his/her family. Refugees are not able to get even personal loans since this requires an Identity  Card, three years of  tax declarations and/or  a statement from an employer. Refugees mainly work in non registered employment and these rules effectively exclude them from capital finance.

As already stated, setting up a small business requires registration with the insurance fund for the self employed, TEBE. The cost per month (45,000 drachmas, 135 euros) is a large expenditure for a small business and acts as a strong barrier for the registration of a business, especially those with low profit margins e.g. small scale hairdressers, small service shops.

Many refugees survive  as small scale traders. Traditionally mainly Greeks are able with  difficulty and  an investment of 1,000,000 (300 euros)[26] to obtain licenses for the popular street market;  this cost is too high for many refugee petty traders who are thus forced to sell illegally in the markets, laying themselves open to fear and fines. The effort by GCR to obtain street licences for these vendors is an important one and if funding for licences can be found can help refugees establish themselves legitimately.

It appears that the current social exclusion legislation and the availability of self employment loans, does not cover refugee cooperatives. De facto some of the small businesses work as cooperatives - with fellow country men working for each other, providing  capital and supporting the business.

The vocational training grants are given some time after the completion of the course and this leads to difficulties for refugees following them. In some cases the requirement that refugees followed vocational training courses, even when they were already qualified, hindered their move to self employment. The non recognition of certificates and qualifications was sometimes a barrier.

Refugees  in several interviews compared their situation to those of close relatives in other European countries who were able to get financial support and business advice.

It appears that in certain types of enterprise it is easier for Greek to obtain the necessary legal licenses than refugees. As a result some refugees are force into using a Greek partner or putting the business in a Greek wife’s name, if they have one. While some Greeks had proved themselves reliable and helpful partners, other refugees had had negative experiences. It is unfortunate when refugees are ‘forced’ into business marriages of any kind to become ‘legitimate’.

Unofficial businesses can’t give official receipts; immediately this confines refugees to other marginal employers or private households. One refugee with a number of people working for him in the cleaning and maintenance sector, pointed out that the barriers to the registration of  his business and the impossibility of obtaining loans for the investment needed in the business, was limiting his expansion.  Self sacrifice and the reinvestment of cash profits was noted by those refugees interviewed who had registered  businesses,  as their only way to expansion. The one refugee who had become a citizen reported that his position eased once he was able to get a bank loan for further investment.

5.     Recommendations and Ideas for supporting refugee self employment

1.      GCR as a Centre for Accompanying Labour Market Measures for Refugees (KESYY) and in cooperation with other organizations with labour market experience, particularly the SWF, as well as the Refugee Association, should consider the more permanent establishment of a Business Advisory service for refugees. This could be done with the support of SEB, EOMMEX and the Chambers of Commerce. Amongst the kinds of work to be undertaken by such a service would be

·                    The writing of guidelines for the setting up of businesses by refugees with some translation of technical terms. Most refugee entrepreneurs speak adequate Greek for everyday usage but do not have the specialist vocabulary necessary. The development of a small "dictionary" of terminology, including technical, legal and tax terminology could be part of the project by NGOs in producing materials on self-employment

·                    Provision of advice and psychological support to prepare refugees for work and the Greek labour market..

·                    Helping refugees with their business plans by developing cooperation with  Economic and Marketing departments in the Universities and Higher Technical Institutes (TEI). A specific recommendation is that students should be offered placements with the NGO project  and asked to help with the development of refugee business plans and particularly with market research and marketing strategy. 

·                    Extending the work of GCR in trying to obtain street trader licenses by discussing with the various Municipalities and/or the Central Organization of Local Authorities (KEDKE) whether there would be any willingness on their part to allow a limited number of street trader licences for recognised refugees at a reduced cost.

·                    Examine the feasibility of using retired successful businessmen and women as volunteer ‘mentors’ to refugees and others wanting to set up in self employment, as has occurred in other EU countries.

·                    Supporting the creation of a small Greek network of refugee entrepreneurs, in association with the Refugee Association, who can provide advice to other refugees considering self-employment.

·                    A Business Advisory service could cooperate with the relevant KEKs and KESYYs involved in the programmes combating social exclusion to ensure that they provide  :

o                   accurate information on the procedures necessary to register and go into business.

o                   Aid knowledge about market trends and demand in Greece, allowing practical seminars where refugee students go out and  ask potential customers about the market for their product or service.

o                   Ensure that in relevant courses refugees and other participants are taught the essential terminology in Greek for business enterprise.

2.      TEBE should be requested to consider what special provisions it can make for those starting up enterprises that come from the social exclusion programmes; a waver could be introduced for the first year of operation of the refugee business, and for all those coming for the Social Exclusion programme. 

3.      Those refugees who have paid IKA (Urban Workers’ Fund for employees) are unaware that 0.45% of this money went to the LAEK fund, specifically designed to support training for individuals in SMEs with less than 10 people,  as well as those people who wish to enter as new self employed persons. This covers people up to 55 years of age as of 2000. The use of LAEK funds for refugee entrepreneurs needs to be investigated.

4. The financing of refugee businesses requires that the banks play a far more active and less conservative role in encouraging entrepreneurship amongst refugees. The figures provided from SWF and GCR suggest that even the current levels of success amongst refugees should be a very good incentive for providing loans. Fear of providing cash loans could be offset by the bank becoming the leasers or purchasers of the equipment for the entrepreneur. In other countries banks also cover the possibilities of bad risk by taking out insurance. A rational system of repayment should take into account the problems of establishing the business in the first year.

A far  more active role could be played by banks if they decided to work in cooperation with the NGOs and form a small bank loan and grant fund in the form of an Enterprise Council for refugees. The amounts for such a Refugee Fund is very small and banks could see such a fund as part of their social spending which might become profitable.  The need for  micro credit institutions in Greece exists not only for refugees but for many small businesses.

A recent Council Directive from the European Commission concerning implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origins[27] will have implications for a number of institutions in Greece and can be used to support the situation of refugees. As the Directive makes clear indirect discrimination that acts against one specific group of people that are racially or ethnically different, can be considered discriminatory. Thus it can be argued that Greek banks, in requiring refugees to have security or a guarantor for a loan, are acting  in a way that discriminates particularly against them. Their practices can be compared to those in other Member States where refugees are able to obtain funding for enterprises.

5.      The National Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Labour have been discussing the importance of setting up "one stop shops" for new entrepreneurs. Although more oriented to foreign and large scale investment, much of the legislation and bureaucratic procedures involved are the same for small entrepreneurs (including refugees and migrants). One stop shops should also cover the needs for information  for SMEs generally.

6.      OTE should be approached to see what help it can give in helping refugee who are new entrepreneurs get a stable telephone as they have no credit cards and other forms of security.

7.      Where refugees can demonstrate knowledge of a trade or skill  there should be some flexibility in the requirement for them to attend the KEK courses, if they feel this is unhelpful. However they should be required to attend courses by KEKS and/or KESYYs,  that relate to employment regulations, marketing, tax and other legal obligations.

8.      A more open and transparent procedure by the Greek authorities allowing refugees to become Greek citizens would not only  aid in their integration but also allow them to compete if they set up enterprises.

9.      There should be clarification in the public sector, specifically OAED and its employment offices,  as to the rights of refugees to access to employment programmes including those for self employment.

10.  It would be highly desirable  for employment programmes for the socially excluded to be run on a longer term basis; one year planning is inadequate. While there does appear to be some clarification in the goals and institutions for such programmes, the evaluation and any necessary changes must be carried out quickly in order to ensure that the relevant institutions are able to implement future programmes without undue delay. Systematic information needs to be given through the KESYY so that refugees are helped properly and know when financial help can be given. Thus budgets need to be decided on in advance.

APPENDIX

INTERVIEWED

Refugees in :

a. Non registered business activity -

Computer services - Iraqui Kurd

Financial services - Iraqui Kurd

Cleaning services - Kurd

Hairdressing - Iranian woman

Small holding (agriculture) - Palestinian

Computer graphics - Turk

b. Registered businesses

Doctor - Albanian refugee,  now a Greek citizen

Café - Turk refugee with Greek wife and another Turkish refugee partner

Restaurant - Turkish refugee

Restaurant - 3 Kurds (one is a registered refugee)

Others

The Governor of the National Manpower and Employment Organization (OAED)

Head of Department responsible for those at risk of labour market exclusion in OAED.

Persons responsible for self employment projects in Social Work Foundation and the Greek Council for Refugees

Researcher - National Employment Institute

Researcher Employment Observatory

Representative from Refugee Council

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